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Dusty Books and Living History:
Why All Those Old State Reports Really Matter*
William P. LaPiana**
Professor LaPiana discusses the importance of the law found in
colonial and state court reports for the development of constitutional
law, criminal law in the antebellum period, and the Reconstruction era
amendments. He urges the use of law reports by both legal and
intellectual historians.
This brief article attempts to justify why old state court records of the
antebellum period' deserve a closer examination by American historians.
These reports form part of the collection of every academic law library in
the United States. The court opinions contained in these often dusty and
seldom-used volumes are an excellent and largely untapped source for the
intellectual history of the age, a history that may be able to tell us a good
deal about the American constitutional tradition.
The Constitution as framed in Philadelphia two hundred years ago was
first and foremost a plan for a government of limited powers. Even with
the addition of the Bill of Rights (an addition that most of the framers
believed to be at best superfluous, and in which they acquiesced in order to
quiet what they saw as the unreasonable fears of some antifederalists), the
Constitution did not and could not embody everything that could be said
about American liberty. The Bill of Rights itself clearly states in the Ninth
Amendment that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
Just what those rights were was a legal question subject to debate. At
least part of the reason for the revolution was a desire to guarantee to
Americans the precious history of freedom as embodied in the English
common law. The common law as the embodiment of English freedom
was, to some degree, the product of English political conflict. But whether
or not it agrees with the canons of historical scholarship, it is hard to deny
* © William P. LaPiana, 1989. This article is an edited version of a speech given at the
program "Legal History and Constitutional Developments Post-1800," 80th Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Law Libraries, Chicago, Illinois, July 7, 1987.
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1. Specifically, from the Revolution until the end of Reconstruction.
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that "[tihe values of the 'ancient constitution' were properly a colonial
birthright, and they were intensified both by their validity in the brief
American experience and their mimicry during the pervasive Anglicization
of early eighteenth-century America."
2
The close connection between common law and the Constitution did
not end with the Revolution. Both before and after the ratification of the
Constitution, the common law as applied by American courts continued to
embody the core values of American life. Antebellum legal science was
devoted to discovering and elucidating the principles of law that were
proper for the new republic. This proposition carried with it at least a
partial rejection of the idea of instrumentalism in antebellum law. The
concept of instrumentalism was invoked by Morton Horwitz in his seminal
work, The Transformation of American Law, to explain the use of
common law rules to promote economic growth in the period before the
Civil War. 3 Professor Horwitz's thesis is that one legacy of the Revolution
was the understanding that judges make law rather than declare it. This
realization abetted activist judges, who consciously shaped private law rules
to throw the cost of economic development on the backs of those least able
to bear it.
Whatever the economic consequences of the rules developed by the
American courts in this period, the intellectual approach to law was based
on the belief that the rules of private law-the rules that governed the daily
relations of people in the world- were governed by principles that existed
in a realm that judges explored, rather than one they created. For legal
thinkers of the period, the principles of the law were no different from the
principles of any other science. These principles were part of nature and
could be explored by investigating the facts of their operation in the world.
When enough facts were understood through careful observation and
classification, principles could be accurately induced.
This Baconian method was the dominant approach to science in the
Anglo-American world at this time.4 Its goal was to describe Nature
accurately; that, in turn, was the key to understanding the Creator. It is not
an exaggeration to say that the goal of the antebellum legal scientist was
understanding the mind of God. God created the rules governing human
2. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERA-
TION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 36-37 (R. Beeman, S. Botein &
E. Carter eds. 1987).
3. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANFORmATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 16-30 (1977).
4. See generally 0. DANIES, AMERICAN SCIENCE IN THE AGE OF JACKSON (1968); T. BOZEMAN,
PROTESTANTISM IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE: THE BACONIAN IDEAL AND ANTEBELLUM RELIGIOUS THOUGHT
(1977).
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life, just as He had created the rules governing the movements of the
heavenly bodies.
Seen in this light, the nature of antebellum law takes on a slightly
different shape, as does the interpretation of events and writings important
to the instrumentalist thesis. One such interpretation involves the
controversy over the role of the common law in the federal courts,
specifically the common law of crimes. The question was whether the
federal courts could entertain prosecutions for activity proscribed only by
the common law. Professor Horwitz considers this debate an important
intellectual event in the destruction of the theory of declaratory judging.
5
Once people understood that judges could arbitrarily create crimes, it was
but a short journey to the conclusion that judges arbitrarily created all legal
rules.
Those involved in the controversy, however, drew a distinction between
the common law of crimes and the common law of private civil relations.
Criminal law played a special role in the young republic. First, there was a
strong belief that enlightened thought required criminal law to be statutory;
the common law of crimes was considered crude and barbaric. Only a
rationally constructed system could foster the proper ends of criminal law
and create better men and a better society. More important to the debate,
however, was the simple fact that the common law of crimes was the
vehicle by which the government could intervene in a citizen's life and
deprive him or her of liberty, property, and life itself. It could be an engine
of oppression: what better tool for a tyrant than to be able to decide ex
post facto that certain behavior was criminal? Criminal law thus should be
written and accessible, and not allowed to reside in the bosom of the
judges.
One of the most eloquent advocates of the position that a person
should not be prosecuted for a crime unless it is specifically proscribed by
statute was John Milton Goodenow. Yet, Goodenow had no trouble
simultaneously believing that the common law of private relationships was
perfect and transcendent. He blasted an Ohio court for punishing a crime
not defined by statute, 6 but proclaimed his faith in the law "of meum and
tuum," based on "[natural] justice and right reason, [which] are the same
in all countries and all ages."
' 7
Gulian Verplanck expressed a similar point of view in An Essay on the
Doctrine of Contracts: Being an Inquiry How Contracts Are Affected in
5. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 9-16.
6. J. GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETcHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF AmRICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 35 (1819 & photo. reprint 1972).
7. Id. at 36.
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Law and Morals by Concealment, Error, or Inadequate Price, published in
1825. Verplanck was deeply Worried by the question posed in the title of his
book. He acknowledged that certain moral duties cannot be enforced by
law. Yet he formulated several principles that were based on the belief that
the degree of fair dealing necessary in ordinary transactions is "perfectly
well understood" 8 and that "the doctrines of sound legal ethics, and those
of a strict and enlighted private honesty, must always run together, except
so far as the former are modified by necessity," 9 which does not happen
often. While Verplanck sanctioned the legal recognition of some sorts of
superior bargaining power and accepted the market economy, he also
believed in the existence of moral principles to which law must conform. '0
Joseph Story took a similar approach to understanding the nature of
the common law, at least as it governed private affairs. He admired Lord
Bacon's "method of induction, that is,... a minute examination of facts,
or what may properly be called experimental philosophy."" This
philosophy had liberated Bacon's age from the bondage of the intellectual
timidity that led fearful men to imprison Galileo and to reject Newton. 12
Story's belief in a transcendent body of law investigated through Baconian
scientific method is clearly seen even in his treatise on the conflicts of
laws. 3 At first glance, the treatise seems to be predicated on the notion that
laws differ among nations simply because different bodies of men make
different laws. A closer reading of the justice's work, however, reveals that
he believed, with Montesquieu, that the laws of a nation conformed to its
"spirit" and that, for commercial nations like the United States, it was the
judges' duty to investigate and apply the body of appropriate laws that
existed.' 4
If this reading of the antebellum idea of law and legal science is correct,
the opinions recorded in those dusty books mentioned at the outset-
assuming they are the practice of the contemporary idea of legal science-
8. G. VERPLANCic, AN ESSAY ON nE DocTiuRNE OF CONTRACTS 137 (1825 & photo. reprint
1972).
9. Id. at 173.
10. Id. at 156-74. Professor Horwitz places sole emphasis on the pro-market aspects of
Verplanck's work and his acceptance of the subjectivity of price. M. HORWITZ, supra note 3, at 181-83.
11. J. STORY, Developments of Science and Mechanic Art, in TrE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF
JOSEPH STORY 475, 479 (,V. Story ed. 1852 & photo, reprint 1972).
12. J. STORY, Characteristics of the Age, in id. at 340, 350-51.
13. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DoMESTc, IN REGARD TO
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, VILLS,
SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (1834).
14. The argument made in this and the preceding sentences is elaborated at length in LaPiana,
Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the Sky: An Investigation of the Idea of Law in
Antebellum America, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 771 (1986).
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are of particular worth for understanding the American mind. The essence
of American liberty existed not in the guarantees of the Constitution (most
of which, of course, did not even apply to the states until relatively recent
times) but in the common law itself. The problems faced in these state
court cases, therefore, often deal with the most basic issues of American
life. For example, in investigating the state court response to Story's
opinion in Swift v. Tyson, one can find discussions of the relative roles of
commerce and agriculture in American life in the course of deciding
questions of negotiability. 15 Mark Tushnet has used the private law of the
antebellum South to sketch the development of a system of law centered on
the perpetuation of slavery, the basic premises of which diverge in
interesting ways from the law developing at the same time in the North. 16
Paul Finkelman has used cases about the private law of slavery to paint a
fascinating picture of legal dissolution of the Union, well under way long
before Fort Sumter.' 7
While these last two examples of historical investigation based on
antebellum case law are both well done and well known, they stand almost
alone in their broad approach to the sources. Most investigations of the
antebellum case record seem to be shaped by the questions Professor
Horwitz first asked. Several investigators have tried to test his hypotheses
further. 18 Such work is important, and the contribution Professor Horwitz
has made in turning attention to the role of law in economic development
has been of major importance in forming the entire field of American legal
history.
Historians outside the law school, however, also should be interested in
the old reporters. Intellectual historians should find much grist for their
mills in these documents. Court opinions are a very real part of the thought
of their times and have the unique quality of being written to state the
"truth" persuasively in order to settle real disputes. More importantly,
these materials are relatively accessible, at least as historical materials go. 9
15. This point is more fully discussed in id.
16. M. TusNar, THE AMERicAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860 (1981).
17. P. FiN nmAN, AN IMPERFECT UMON (1981). See also P. FncamuAN, ThE LAW OF FREEDOM
AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK (1986).
18. See, e.g., Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CALrn.
L. REv. 217 (1984); Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981); Note, Eminent Domain in Indiana: 1816-1865, 54 IND. L.J.
427 (1979); Freyer, Antebellum Commerical Law: Common Law Approaches to Secured Transactions,
70 Ky. L.J. 593 (1981-82).
19. The definition of the common law as "chaos with an index" was first coined by T.E.
Holland. See Questions & Answers, 79 LAW LEaR. J. 599, 599-601 (1987). The usual assumption is that
the definition is uttered by lawyers with a certain weary resignation. The historian, however, should
utter the same phrase with a different inflection: "Chaos, but with an index!"
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Much of the antebellum case record has been digested, both at the time
of original publication and at the time of republication in the later
nineteenth century, when many of these books were considered somewhat
rare. In addition, many of these reprints contain more or less extensive
notes and cross-references, which are of great help in tracing the treatment
of a particular point. The digests have to be used with care and often are
not classified in particularly useful ways. Many of the early cases deal
solely with points of pleading-an interesting study in itself, of course-
and many others are grouped by fact pattern rather than concepts. On the
whole, however, the existing case finding tools should be of great help.
How then does this repository of thought about private law shed light
on the document that still forms the basis of our federal government?
There is a relationship between the history of American thought revealed in
these early cases and the understanding of the Constitution. The document
written in Philadelphia two hundred years ago was an experiment. The
government it created was something new in the Western world. Exactly
how it would work and how it would govern the lives of the new nation's
citizens was left to the trial of experience. 20 Private rights had to be
adjusted, both in relation to others' private rights and the rights of the
public. This balancing act, which took place between the ratification of the
Constitution and the end of the Civil War, shaped American ideas of
ordered liberty.
In addition, experience in both state and federal antebellum courts was
the legal heritage of the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments, which
to a great degree remade the Constitution. 2' The language they used,
especially in the Fourteenth Amendment, perhaps can be illuminated by a
careful examination of the legal context in which the framers of the
amendments lived. In fact, the intentions of the framers of these crucial
amendments may be more relevant to our interpretation of the
Constitution than that of the original Framers of 1787. Certainly, the men
of the Reconstruction Congresses and of the state legislatures that adopted
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments had the advantage
of having seen how the new republic had developed. They also believed
that the end of the Civil War had given the nation, at least in part, a new
beginning. This perspective may have given them more definite ideas about
the influence of their work on the future of American life, and their views
are worth investigating for that reason as well.
20. For a careful recent discussion of this point, see Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and
Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U.L. REv. 800, 811-32 (1986).
21. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U.L. REv. 863 (1986).
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There is yet another reason to encourage investigation of the
antebellum idea of law. Even if we give up on trying to determine the
relevance of "original intent," it is still important for us as Americans to
try to understand how our ancestors understood the meaning of American
life. Unlike many other countries, which share a common culture, all we
Americans have is our history: ethnically and religiously diverse, we have
nothing else to bind us. In fact, we have long invited other people to
become Americans (with some regrettable exceptions) by adhering to our
history and by subscribing to the concepts of liberty on which our nation
presumably was founded. We are a created people, an artifact, held
together by ideas of what our nation is all about.
Consequently, we tend to carry on our political discourse in terms of
history. Richard Epstein, for example, recently attempted to define
property rights that cannot be taken without compensation by referring to
nineteenth century torts cases. Much of the work on which Professor
Horwitz built-Hartz's work on Pennsylvania22 and the Handlins'
investigations of Massachusetts 23-was produced in a conscious effort to
show that state intervention in the economy was not an idea new to the
1930s. Today, of course, we debate the "original intent" of the Framers of
the Constitution, a concept that was discussed publicly during the hearings
on Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court.
In such an intellectual atmosphere, it seems almost self- evident that we
need a thorough understanding of what our ancestors thought about the
basic qualities of American life. Their response to change should tell us
something about our own. The extent to which they applied and molded
the principles of the common law should speak to our need to formulate
some balance between what should and should not change in our concepts
of constitutional liberty. Their thought is locked up in those dusty books
on the shelves of law libraries all over America. The time has come to dust
them off and use them.
22. L. HARz, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNsYLvANIA, 1776-1860 (1948).
23. 0. HANDLN & M. HANDLIN, CommoNwALTH: MAssAcHusETTs 1774-1861 (1947).
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